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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT RELATED TO CROSS APPEAL 
Despite the fact that Defendants do not actually dispute that the principal amount 
due and owing under the Trust Deed is $245,590.45 or that the interest rate is 9.5%, they 
nevertheless ask this Court to affirm the trial court's decision that the Trust Deed is 
invalid on the "alternate basis" that Franklin did not call a records custodian to testify at 
trial as to this undisputed amount and interest rate. (Def. Br. at 37). Franklin was not 
required to offer such additional evidence in order to proceed with its judicial or non-
judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. In an abundance of caution, however, Franklin 
moved the trial court to re-open the trial in order to allow it to offer additional evidence 
of the principal amount and interest rate in the event the trial court determined that such 
additional evidence was needed. The trial court, in its discretion, granted Franklin's 
Motion to Re-Open. The trial court ultimately ruled that the Trust Deed was invalid and, 
consequently, the Motion was rendered moot. 
In their cross appeal, Defendants have failed to sustain their burden of 
demonstrating that the trial court's granting of the Motion was an abuse of discretion. To 
the contrary, to the extent any additional evidence is needed, the re-opening of the trial to 
allow for the presentation of such evidence is just and fair to both Franklin and 
Defendants. This Court should affirm the trial court's granting of the Motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
Utah courts have "long held" that "where one of two innocent parties must suffer a 
loss because of the misconduct of the third . . .
 5 the law generally leans towards placing 
the loss upon the one who made the choice and created the circumstance out of which the 
loss came about." SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2008 UT App 31, f 23, 177 P.3d 629. In 
this case, Blaine "made the choice" to grant Shirley unfettered authority over their 
personal and business finances and thereby "created the circumstances" that allowed 
Shirley to engage in the alleged "wrongful acts" of which he complains. Blaine, not 
Franklin, should bear any loss related to his choice and the circumstances he created. 
L FRANKLIN SATISIFIED ITS MARSHALING BURDEN. 
As a preliminary matter, Defendants incorrectly argue that Franklin failed to 
satisfy its marshaling burden. (Def. Br. at 12). The trial court did not rule that the Trust 
Agreement and/or the General Durable POA were ambiguous. Consequently, the trial 
court's interpretation of Section 11.1 of the Trust Deed and the POA are legal 
conclusions which are reviewed by this Court for correctness. They are not "fact-
sensitive" and Franklin is not required to marshal the evidence in support of them. 
Moreover, the trial court failed to address Franklin's argument that Shirley had actual 
authority to execute the Trust Deed pursuant to Section 4.2 of the Trust Agreement. This 
Court may interpret Section 4.2 as a matter of law and Franklin is not required to marshal 
AHA i_7 in/urni i 2 
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the evidence in connection with this argument. Similarly, the trial court failed to address 
Franklin's argument that the Trust Deed is valid under the former Utah Code Ann. § 75-
7-406. Given that matters of statutory construction also are questions of law, Franklin is 
not required to marshal the evidence in connection with this argument. Finally, Franklin 
did marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact related to its 
actual, apparent and/or implied authority claims, its ratification claim, and its claim that 
the Trust Deed is a valid lien on Shirley's one-half interest in the Property. 
II. SECTION 4.2 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT GAVE SHIRLEY ACTUAL 
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE WARRANTY DEED. 
As trustor of the Trust, Shirley reserved to herself the power to withdraw the 
Property from the Trust at any time, with or without notice to Blaine, pursuant to Section 
4.2 of the Trust Agreement, which provides: 
We each reserve to ourselves the following powers: 
(a) the right to withdraw property from this Trust in any 
amount and at any time upon giving reasonable notice in 
writing to any one or more of the Trustees. Such notice is 
required only if we are not then serving as a Trustee of this 
Trust. 
Defendants do not dispute that the Trust Agreement does not limit the type or 
amount of trust property that can be withdrawn pursuant to Section 4.2. Rather, 
Defendants argue that "both Shirley and Blaine" were required to act under Section 4.2. 
(Def. Br. at 29). Defendants' interpretation is contrary to the plain language of Section 
4841-3106-0743.1 3 
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4.2 and would render the use of the word "each" wholly superfluous. The word "each" is 
a distributive pronoun defined as "being one of two or more distinct individuals having a 
similar relation and often constituting an aggregate." Merriam-Webster's Online, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/each (last visited October 26, 2010). l It is 
in used in contradistinction to "all." "Ourselves" is defined as those identical to us. Id. at 
/ourselves. Consequently, although Section 4.2 refers to the trustors ("ourselves") as a 
group, the use of the word "each" clearly indicates that one member of the group, i.e., 
Blaine or Shirley, could withdraw the Property at any time. This is consistent with the 
remainder of the provision, which requires notice to "one or more" of the trustees only if 
the withdrawing trustor is not then serving as a trustee. The interpretation urged by 
Defendants is contrary to the rules of contract interpretation and should be rejected. See 
Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraetner, LLC, 2009 UT 7, \ 15, 210 P.3d 263; Cafe 
Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gijford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ^ 25, 207 P.3d 1235.3 
A distributive pronoun considers each member of a group separately, rather than 
collectively. Id. at /distributive pronoun. 
2
 In interpreting contracts, the ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is given 
effect, which ordinary meaning is often best determined through standard, non-legal 
dictionaries. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass yn, 899 P.2d 779, 782 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995 (citations omitted). 
3
 Nor do Sections 4.5 and 4.7 of the Trust Agreement support Defendants' interpretation. 
(Def. Br. at 29). Section 4.5 refers to "either" Blaine or Shirley and "the other" trustees. 
And there is nothing in Section 4.7 that requires joint action. It simply requires a trustor 
to deliver written notice of an exercise of a reserved power to a trustee unless otherwise 
4841-3106-0743.1 4 
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Defendants' proposed interpretation also ignores the repeated use of plural pronouns such 
as "we" to refer to a single trustor or trustee. For example, in Section 4.2, its states that 
written notice is required only if "we" are not then serving as "a Trustee." 
Pursuant to the plain language of Section 4.2, Shirley, as trustor, had actual 
authority to execute the Warranty Deed whereby the Property was conveyed out of the 
Trust and to Blaine and Shirley as joint tenants. Once removed, there is no question the 
POA gave Shirley actual authority to execute the Trust Deed on behalf of Blaine in his 
individual capacity. The Trust Deed is valid under Section 4.2 of the Trust Agreement. 
IIL SECTION 11.1 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT GAVE SHIRLEY ACTUAL 
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE WARRANTY DEED. 
Shirley also had actual authority to execute the Warranty Deed as trustee of the 
Trust pursuant to Section 11.1 of the Trust Agreement, which provides as follows: 
Without regard to any legal restrictions otherwise applicable 
to trustees, the Trustees are authorized to exercise the 
following powers as well as any other powers conferred by 
law, in their sole and absolute discretion. 
* * * 
(g) To borrow money for any trust purpose and to pledge 
all or part of the Trust Property to secure such borrowing 
without incurring any personal liability therefor. 
provided in the Trust Agreement. As stated above, Section 4.2 does not require written 
notice to the trustee if the trustor is serving as a trustee. 
4841-3106-0743.1 5 
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(See Add. 3) (emphasis added). Although the usual and ordinary meaning of "sole" is 
"one person," Defendants argue that the "context" of Section 11.1 "evinces an opposite 
intent" that both trustees were required to act. (Def. Br. at 30). This argument suffers 
from the same defect as their Section 4.2 argument. 
The Trust Agreement is a form-book agreement into which Blaine and Shirley's 
financial planner inserted their names. Many of the provisions of the Trust Agreement 
are simply not applicable and the plural "Trustees" is used in places where it is obvious 
that the singular "Trustee" is intended. (See, e.g., Sections 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 8.1, 
9.1, and 9.2). As Shirley testified, she had no intent with respect to whether they were 
required to act together or alone under the Trust Agreement generally or Section 11.1 
specifically. Blaine and Shirley did not discuss this issue with each other when they 
executed the Trust Agreement. (R. 1385 at 68, 75). Blaine did not pay any attention to 
Section 11.1 when he executed the Trust Agreement, much less discuss it or have an 
understanding of it. (R. 1386 at 124). Nor were they told by their financial planner or 
their attorney that they had to act jointly under the Trust Agreement. (R. 1385 at 65). 
Indeed, Defendants do not dispute that if there was a "joint action" requirement, they 
ignored it without exception, whether Shirley was writing checks or Blaine was signing 
the Settlement Agreement between the Chapter 7 Trustee and the Trust in the Bankruptcy 
Action. (R. at 1385 at 65-66; Tr. Ex. 48). The Trust Deed is valid under Section 11.1. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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IV. SHIRLEY'S EXECUTION OF THE WARRANTY DEED AND TRUST DEED 
WAS NOT A GRATUITUOUS TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY NOR DID IT 
REVOKE OR MODIFY THE TRUST. 
There is no limitation on Shirley's authority in the POA. Defendants previously 
conceded the POA authorized Shirley to sign Blaine's name in his individual capacity. 
(R. 447, 697). Defendants do not rebut Franklin's argument that neither the Trust 
Agreement nor Utah law would have prevented Shirley from executing the Warranty 
Deed on behalf of Blaine as trustee pursuant to the POA. Nor do Defendants dispute that 
the trial court's ruling was not based on an analysis of the plain language of the POA or 
Utah law but rather a mistaken belief, unsupported by any evidence presented at trial, that 
Bank One "required a Special Power of Attorney as to specific property" for the loan. 
Instead, Defendants argue that the POA nevertheless "did not authorize what 
Shirley did, either for Blaine personally or the trust" because it could not be used to 
"make a gift" and that Shirley's execution of the Warranty Deed and Trust Deed was 
somehow a "gratuitous transfer" of the Property. (Def. Br. at 17, 19). The premise of 
this argument is fundamentally flawed because Shirley's execution of the Warranty Deed 
and Trust Deed was not a "gift" to herself or a third party. Blaine and Shirley - the 
trustors, trustees, and beneficiaries - received $247,000 in loan proceeds in exchange for 
the Trust Deed. This is not "nominal consideration," The loan proceeds were also used 
to benefit another asset of the Trust, Hanney & Hanney. 
4841-3106-0743.1 7 
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Further, withdrawing the Property from the Trust or encumbering the Property is 
not "amending" or "revoking" the Trust Agreement. If so, every time a check was 
written by the Blaine or Shirley, it would constitute an amendment or revocation of the 
Trust Agreement. Consequently, Defendants' reliance on Huntsman v. Huntsman, 192 P. 
368 (Utah 1920), Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246, and Kline v. Utah Dept of Health, 
776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), is misplaced. Even if the execution of the Warranty 
Deed was somehow a revocation of the Trust, Shirley had the right to do so because "the 
right to revoke a trust in whole or in part is recognized as one of the inherent rights of the 
settlor." In re Estate of West, 915 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
V. THE TRUST DEED IS VALID PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §75-7-406. 
Defendants do not dispute that the Trust Deed is valid pursuant to the former Utah 
Code Ann. §75-7-406, which was in effect in 2000: 
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or 
assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the 
existence of trust power and their proper exercise by the 
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is 
not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is 
properly exercising the power; and a third person, without 
actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his power or 
improperly exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with 
the trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised 
the powers he purports to exercise . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 (emphasis added) (2003). Section 75-7-406 was repealed in 
2004 and replaced with §75-7-1012, not §75-7-816 as stated by Defendants. Thus, 
AOAl l i f t / : f\1A1 1 X 
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Bank One's alleged knowledge of the existence of the Trust pursuant to the Commitment 
for Title Insurance is not relevant. (Def. Br. at 28, fn. 10). The only knowledge that 
would be relevant is actual knowledge that Shirley's actions in withdrawing the Property 
from the Trust or executing the Trust Deed exceeded her authority as trustee. Defendants 
do not dispute that Franklin lacked such actual knowledge. Accordingly, the Trust Deed 
is valid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406. 
VI. SHIRLEY HAD IMPLIED AND/OR APPARENT AUTHORITY, 
Shirley had implied and/or apparent authority to execute the Warranty Deed and 
the Trust Deed. Shirley had implied authority because obtaining the loans was incidental 
to the absolute authority which Blaine delegated to her. Specifically, Blaine delegated to 
Shirley complete authority for all of their financial affairs. Her implied authority is not 
based solely on the POA, although it is further evidence of Blaine's delegation of 
authority.4 (Def. Br. at 26). Nor is Bank One's alleged lack of knowledge of, or reliance 
on, the POA relevant to an implied authority determination. (Id. at 26-27). Indeed, as 
Blaine's spouse, Shirley is considered to have implied authority to act as an agent for 
Blaine because their agency relationship is supported by facts and circumstances beyond 
There is no requirement that Shirley have a "subjective belief that she had implied 
authority. In any event, Defendants' assertion that Shirley did not have a subjective 
belief that the "power of attorney was usable" is contrary to her testimony at trial. 
Shirley testified that she "knew" she could use it to obtain the loans after using it to 
obtain the Key Bank loan. (R. 1385 at 129). 
4841-3106-0743.1 9 
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their marital relationship. Like the husband in Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 
UT 43, 24 P.3d 984, Shirley handled the financial aspects of the marriage and Blaine did 
not take "an active role" in managing or monitoring his financial affairs. Consequently, 
Shirley's knowledge is imputed to Blaine and he should not be allowed to "disavow 
knowledge of the events surrounding [the transactions at issue] simply because [his wife] 
handled [his] business for [him]." See Macris at \ 23; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-8 
("husband or wife may constitute the other his or her attorney in fact to control and 
dispose of his or her property for their mutual benefit or otherwise, and may revoke the 
appointment the same as other persons"). 
As for Shirley's apparent authority, Blaine certainly "contributed to the formation 
of a belief that she was his agent and was cloaked with authority to sign his name on 
important legal documents and otherwise handle all of his financial affairs. See Workers' 
Compensation Fund v. Wadman Corp., 2009 UT 18, fflf 10-11, 210 P.3d 277 (apparent 
authority exists when principal contributes to formation of belief that individual was 
principal's agent or when principal knowingly permits presumptive agent to assume the 
exercise of such authority). 
A*A\.'\\(\f>jmA'\ 1 10 
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VII. SHIRLEY WAS NOT A "THIEF" NOR WAS SHE "SELF-DEALING." 
Defendants' attempt to label Shirley as a "thief is also unavailing. (Def. Br. at 
31). As Blaine repeatedly testified at trial, Shirley was a joint owner of the Property? 
She helped pay for the lot and for the house that was built on the lot. She helped pay for 
the insurance and real property taxes for the Property. She was trustor, trustee, and 
beneficiary of the Trust. The cases cited by Defendants in support of their "thief 
argument are equally unpersuasive. For example, in The Corporation of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jolley, the issue was whether a 
constructive trust could be imposed on two automobiles given to Jolley by an employee 
of the LDS Church who had used embezzled funds to purchase the vehicles. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that a constructive trust may be impressed upon stolen or embezzled 
money. 467 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1970). This is not the situation presented in this case. 
Nor can Shirley be characterized as a "self-dealing" trustee. She obtained the 
loans to pay the debts and obligations of Hanney & Hanney, a purported asset of the 
Trust, and to repay Hanney Development. Although perhaps misguided, Shirley was 
attempting to act in the best interests of Blaine, as her husband and as an officer and 
director of Hanney & Hanney, and the Trust. Even if Shirley breached her duty of 
loyalty, the Trust Deed is not voidable under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 because this 
Indeed, Blaine admitted at trial that he never asked that criminal charges be filed 
against Shirley for any of the transactions at issue in this case. (R. 1386 at 100). 
4X41-1106-07411 11 
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provision is subject to "the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as 
provided in Section 75-7-1012." 
VIII. DEFENDANTS RATIFIED THE TRUST DEED. 
Defendants ratified the Trust Deed. Defendants make four arguments against 
ratification. First, Defendants argue Franklin failed to satisfy its marshaling burden. 
(Def. Br. at 33). Second, Defendants argue there was no evidence Blaine intended to 
"ratify any of Shirley's wrongful acts." (Id. at 34). Third, Defendants argue Blaine 
"never had full knowledge of all the facts." (Id.). And finally, Defendants argue there 
was no "written ratification." (Id.). These arguments are without merit. 
Franklin marshaled all evidence presented at trial supporting the trial court's 
ratification decision, including evidence not cited in the Memorandum Decision. For 
example, Franklin cited Shirley's testimony that when Blaine asked to look at bank 
records, she told him that the records were at the accountant's office. Franklin also cited 
Blaine's testimony that he lost "several hundred thousand dollars" as a result of Shirley's 
acts. (PL Br. at 44-45). Indeed, Defendants fail to identify any supporting evidence not 
identified in Franklin's opening brief. 
The clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that Blaine had the requisite intent 
and knowledge to ratify the Warranty Deed and Trust Deed. At the time he signed the 
Schedules in the Bankruptcy Action and his amended 2002 tax return, he knew all of the 
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facts and circumstances surrounding the Trust Deed. Blaine's willful ignorance of all the 
information that would have been revealed if he had simply bothered to review hi~ own 
tax returns does not allow him to escape ratification. He cannot "disavow knowledge" of 
the loans simply because Shirley handled his financial affairs for him. See Maoris, supra, 
2001 UT 43, % 23 (wife cannot disavow knowledge of events surrounding cancellation of 
stock simply because her husband handled her business for her); cf. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (wife jointly liable for tax liens 
because she knew withholding taxes were not being paid, she shared the benefits derived 
from spending the employees' withholdings, and she had the power to correct the 
situation as a co-owner). 
With respect to Defendants' fourth argument, Utah law does not require Blaine's 
ratification to be in writing.6 Indeed, such a requirement would eviscerate Utah case law 
holding that a principal may "impliedly" ratify an agreement by silence, acquiescence, 
failure to promptly disaffirm, and/or retention of the fruits of the agreement. See Moses 
v. Archie McFarland & Son, 230 P.2d 571, 574 (Utah 1951); Lowe v. April Indus,, Inc., 
531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah 1974); Zions First Nat'I Bank v: ClarkClinic Corp., 762 P.2d 
6
 In Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982), the presumptive agent entered 
into an oral contract for the sale of two parcels of land owned by defendants. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that there was no ratification as a matter of law because the Utah 
Statute of Frauds states that every contract for the lease or sale of any interest in lands is 
void unless the contract is in writing signed by the lawful agent of the party by whom the 
sale is to be made. In this case, there was no contract for the lease or sale of the Property. 
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1090, 1099 (Utah 1988). Even if there was such a requirement, Blaine's ratification of 
Shirley's authority was in writing. Not only did he sign the POA, he also signed the 
Schedules in the Bankruptcy Action and his amended 2002 tax return. (R. 1385 at 240; 
1386 at 170-72; Tr. Exs. 40 and 43). 
Defendants' assertion there is not a "scintilla of evidence" that Blaine had 
personally liability for any Hanney & Hanney debt or obligation also is incorrect. Blaine 
included all of Hanney & Hanney's debts and obligations on his Schedules in the 
Bankruptcy Action and identified them as "joint obligations." (Tr. Ex. 43, attached to PL 
Br. as Addendum 1). Finally, the evidence at trial demonstrated that Blaine received 
significant benefits as result of the loans, including the repayment of the $45,000 
borrowed from their joint savings account, the $50,000 per year salary of Shirley, the 
repayment of some of the "loans" Shirley obtained from Hanney Development, and the 
mortgage interest deductions on their federal and state income tax returns. Defendants' 
assertion that there was somehow no "benefit" or "unjust enrichment" as a result of the 
mortgage interest deduction because "mortgage interest was paid to Bank One" is 
similarly incorrect. (Def. Br. at 36). The interest payments under the loans, including the 
Bank One loan, were made from Hanney & Hanney's account, not Blaine and Shirley's 
personal account. (See, e.g., Tr. Ex. 56). Blaine cannot have it both ways. In addition, 
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the loans were booked as loans of Hanney & Hanney, which offset its income and 
resulted in losses which were then deducted from Blaine and Shirley's individual income 
tax returns. (Tr. Exs. 31-42). Defendants ratified the Trust Deed. 
IX, ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRUST DEED IS A VALID LIEN ON SHIRLEY'S 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. 
Despite the fact that Blaine and Shirley paid for the undeveloped lot from their 
joint funds, built the house on the lot with money they had saved together, and paid for 
the real property taxes from their joint account to which they both contributed, 
Defendants argue that Shirley "had no interest in the house which was transferrable." 
(Def. Br. at 15). Despite the fact that the Schedules in the Bankruptcy Action, which 
were signed by Blaine under penalty of perjury and with the advice of legal counsel, refer 
to the Property as jointly owned, Defendants claim that Shirley had no interest "which 
any creditor's claim could attach." Despite the fact that Shirley was identified as a 
"grantor" on the Special Warranty Deed and as a joint owner of the Property on two 
easements deeds recorded in 1979, the Davis County tax records, and the homeowner's 
insurance, Defendants argue that Shirley's interest "was merely an expectancy." (Def. 
Br. at 16). Shirley's interest in the Property, however, does not derive from her status as 
Blaine's wife. Shirley was a joint owner of the Property. 
She also possessed an equitable interest in the Property at the time she executed 
the Trust Deed. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307, 308 (Utah 1988) (if a 
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spouse has by her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or 
protection of property, such spouse acquires an equitable interest in such property). 
Under Utah law, an equitable interest can be encumbered by a lien or trust deed. See 
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah 1983) (citing Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 
Utah, 646 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1982)) (an equitable interest can be the subject of a 
mortgage as well as a trustee's sale); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 75(c) & (e) (1949); cf 
Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987)) (under doctrine of equitable conversion, buyer 
under a uniform real estate contract "obtains an equitable interest in the land itself, even 
though the [seller] retains the legal title" and such equitable interest is an "interest in real 
property to which judgment liens may attach as to any other real property interest..."). 
Finally, Defendants cite Wyoming and Kansas cases to support their argument that 
"during marriage, property in one spouse's name is not exposed to the other spouse's 
creditors."7 (Def. Br. at 14-15). These cases are inconsistent with Defendants' position 
that the Property was an asset of the Trust. Indeed, at the time the divorce action was 
filed, the Property was not "separate property" held in the name of Blaine. Thus, the 
7
 The Nielson v. Thompson case cited by Defendants is not on point and conflicts with 
Utah law. In Nielsen, the issue was whether a judgment creditor of one of the spouses 
could intervene in a divorce proceeding to attempt to collect on its judgment against the 
non-party spouse. 982 P.2d. 709, 710 (Wyo. 1999). The property in question was the 
separate property of the spouse, who was not obligated under the judgment lien. There 
was no claim that marital property was involved. 
/ foxi -i iA/- m x i 1 I A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wyoming and Kansas cases cited by Defendants are inapplicable. Further, Defendants 
"concede" that upon the commencement of the divorce action, the Property was a marital 
asset." (Def. Br. at 14). Thus, even if Shirley's interest in the Property was inchoate, her 
interest vested on February 11, 2005, the date she filed the divorce action. See Nielson at 
710 (spouse's inchoate interest vests upon filing of divorce complaint). On that date, the 
Trust Deed became a lien on the Shirley's interest in the Property pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-20, which provides that "[a]ll right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust 
property acquired by the trustor . . . subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, shall 
inure to the trustee as security for the obligation or obligations for which the trust 
property is conveyed as if acquired before execution of the trust deed." 
X, THIS COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS1 CROSS APPEAL. 
Defendants' cross appeal is much ado about nothing because Franklin is not 
required to judicially foreclose the Trust Deed. Even if it were, the principal amount due 
and owing under the Trust Deed has never been in dispute. Indeed, Franklin filed the 
Motion to Re-Open only as a precautionary measure because Defendants raised the issue 
in their post-trial brief. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Motion. 
A. Franklin Is Not Required to Judicially Foreclose the Trust Deed. 
Franklin is not required to judicially foreclose the Trust Deed simply because it 
included a claim for judicial foreclosure in the First Amended Complaint. The "single 
point" of this action was not, as stated by Defendants, Franklin's "desire for judicial 
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foreclosure." (Def. Br. at 37). The "single point" of this action was to establish the 
validity of the Trust Deed as a lien on the Property. As asserted by Defendants in their 
Counterclaim, ua real case and controversy exists regarding the validity of the Bank One 
Deed of Trust." (R. 59). All of the discovery and the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment focused on the central issue of whether the Trust Deed is a valid lien on the 
Property. The amount due and owing under the Trust Deed was not even identified as a 
controverted issue for trial in the Joint Final Pre-Trial Order. (R. 994-1035). 
If the trial court ruled that the Trust Deed was valid, Franklin would have had the 
right to complete its non-judicial foreclosure even if the trial court denied the Motion or 
declined to order a judicial foreclosure of the Tmst Deed. A non-judicial foreclosure of 
the Trust Deed was commenced on February 13, 2003 with the recording of a Notice of 
Default. (R. 1386 at 178-80). A few weeks later, Blaine and Shirley filed for 
bankruptcy. When Bank One sought relief from the automatic stay to complete its 
foreclosure, Defendants asserted the Trust Deed was not a valid lien on Blaine's one-half 
interest in the Property.8 (Tr. Ex. 44). Consequently, Franklin was forced to file this 
action to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Trust Deed was a valid lien on Blaine's 
interest in the Property. In addition to its claims for declaratory judgment, equitable 
estoppel, ratification, and equitable lien, Franklin also included a claim for judicial 
8
 Defendants did not challenge the validity of the Trust Deed on Shirley's one-half 
interest in the Property until this action was filed. 
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foreclosure as a matter of practice. (R. 29-40). By doing so, Franklin did not somehow 
waive its right to complete the non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed if it chose to do 
so. Indeed, Franklin never cancelled the Notice of Default. 
B. At Trial, Franklin Was Not Required to Introduce Evidence of the 
Undisputed Principal Amount Due and Owing Under the Trust Deed. 
Even if it decided to proceed with a judicial foreclosure, Franklin was not required 
to introduce evidence at trial regarding the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed. 
The parties signed and filed a Joint Final Pre-Trial Order on January 26, 2009 which set 
forth the "controverted facts/issues55 for trial. Defendants did not include the amount due 
and owing under the Trust Deed as a controverted fact or issue. Indeed, the principal 
amount due and owing under the Trust Deed has never been in dispute and the parties 
implicitly reserved the issue of the amount of interest and attorney fees and costs for 
future determination. This made sense because interest would continue to accrue and 
attorney fees and costs would continue to be incurred until the issue of the validity of the 
Trust Deed was resolved. If the trial court determined that the Trust Deed was valid, 
Franklin could then present by affidavit the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed. 
If Defendants disagreed with how interest was calculated, or the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees and costs incurred by Franklin, they would have had the opportunity to 
object prior to the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure. Moreover, there is nothing in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901 et seq. or the case law cited by Defendants requiring such 
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evidence to be presented at trial. The Jewkes case cited by Defendants simply refers to 
evidence in the record. See Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 
(Utah 1984) (awarded judgment must be based on "evidence in the record."). 
Further, Franklin did present evidence at trial of the principal amount due and 
owing under the Trust Deed after Shirley stopped making payments. In Trial Exhibit 59, 
which was prepared by Shirley for her accountant after her activities came to light in 
February 2003, the principal amount due and owing under the Trust Deed is stated as 
$245,590.25. (See Trial Exhibit 59, attached as Appendix L to Def. Br.). This is the 
same principal amount stated by Franklin in its Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures and 
Supplemental Response to Defendants' Second Set of Discovery Requests.9 (R. 1227-32; 
1046-47, attached hereto as Addenda 1 and 2). Shirley also testified at trial that the 
interest rate on the Bank One loan was 9.5% per annum. (R. 1385 at 16). Shirley further 
testified the Bank One loan was in default and she has not made any payments on it since 
November 2002. (Id. at 17-18). This evidence is more than sufficient for a judgment. 
Finally, Defendants have never identified any facts that would contradict Trial 
Exhibit 59. Indeed, notably missing from Defendants' brief is any statement that they 
actually dispute that the principal amount due and owing is $245,590.25 or that the 
interest rate is 9.5%. Thus, the calculation of the amount of unpaid interest is a matter of 
9
 The Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures were filed on December 6, 2006. The Supplemental 
Response was filed on February 4, 2009. 
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simple math which does not require trial testimony or experts. Similarly, evidence 
regarding attorney fees and costs is more appropriately submitted to the trial court after a 
ruling on the merits of the claims. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Re-Opening the Trial. 
If there was a good faith dispute as to the principal amount due and owing or if 
Franklin should have introduced evidence at trial of the amount of unpaid interest that has 
accrued, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-opening the trial to allow 
Franklin to introduce such evidence. See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and 
Heating v. Aspen Const, 977 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (no abuse of discretion 
in granting motion to re-open case to allow introduction of documents that were exhibits 
to complaint); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gardner, 668 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1983) 
(no abuse of discretion in re-opening case to receive additional evidence after court had 
entered order in form of unsigned minute entry). 
Defendants have not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting the Motion. Instead, Defendants vaguely suggest that "unfair prejudice exists in 
this case." (Def. Br. at 39). In support, Defendants state that Franklin "never revealed 
any bank employee, witness, or document who would present the amount due under the 
trust deed" and "waited until all the evidence had been submitted and arguments have 
been made to correct a fundamental flaw in its case." (Id. at 39-40). Defendants also 
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state that Franklin did not offer an explanation as to why it did not offer additional 
evidence of the amount due and owing at trial. {Id. at 40). These unsupported 
statements, even if true, would not render the trial court's decision an abuse of discretion. 
These statements, however, are not accurate. Franklin did offer an explanation to the trial 
court. (R. 1144-46). And, Franklin provided Defendants with a computation of the 
amounts due and owing under the Trust Deed with its Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures. 
(R. 1227-32). This computation, which was attached as Exhibit B, stated the unpaid 
principal balance was $245,590.25, the unpaid interest was $102,396.36 through 
December 31, 2006, and the unpaid late fees were $547.42. The computation further 
stated that the October 13, 2002 payment had not been made and that the per diem was 
$63.92. Franklin provided Defendants with an updated computation in January 2009, 
which showed that the amount of unpaid accrued interest had increased to $150,977.26. 
At no time prior to trial did Defendants conduct any discovery related to 
Franklin's computation. Defendants never sought to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition 
of Bank One or Franklin. Defendants did not identify any experts to challenge the 
application of payments or the calculation of interest under the Bank One loan. 
Defendants did not deem it necessary to file any pleadings or request any hearings on the 
computation prior to the trial, at which they were presumably expecting to dispute the 
amount due and owing. Defendants did not ask Shirley any questions about her 
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payments or Franklin's computation. The reason for this is obvious: the interest rate and 
the principal amount due and owing have never been in dispute in this case. 
Importantly, Defendants fail to explain how they would be disadvantaged by the 
trial court's re-opening of the trial to allow Franklin to correct this alleged "fundamental 
flaw." See Ross v. Leftwich, 377 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1963) (plaintiffs immediate 
motion to re-open to provide proof should have been granted because it was timely made 
and would not have placed defendants to a disadvantage). The trial court appropriately 
recognized that it would be inequitable and unjust to preclude Franklin from introducing 
additional evidence as to the amount due and owing if Defendants continued to insist that 
such additional evidence was required. See Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 
(Utah 1980) (motion to reopen case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court but 
such discretion may not be exercised in a capricious and arbitrary manner which 
produces an inequitable or unjust result). Given Franklin's right to proceed with a non-
judicial foreclosure, the trial court's decision is just and fair for both Franklin and 
Defendants. Indeed, Defendants spend three pages in their brief complaining about 
possible "prejudice" to their redemption rights. (Def. Br. at 42-44). This alleged 
prejudice, however, would not be the result of re-opening the trial. It would be the result 
of not re-opening the trial. If Defendants have a good faith basis for disputing the 
principal amount due and owing under the Trust Deed or the interest rate - which they 
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have yet to articulate in any pleading or brief- then re-opening the trial to allow them to 
challenge such amount prior to a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure would protect their 
interests. 
Nor are the cases cited by Defendants helpful to their position. Unlike the 
defendant in Lewis, Franklin did not absent itself from trial. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 
P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976). Unlike the plaintiff in Bekins Bar V Ranch, Franklin did not 
wait until after the trial court ruled on the merits of its claims to move to re-open the trial. 
See Bekins Bar VRanch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah 1982) (For 
the first time on appeal, plaintiff alleged there was no valid delivery of a deed. In 
affirming, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[pjrior to the court's ruling, plaintiff never 
amended its pleading in any way to assert lack of delivery. . . Once both parties have 
rested and the court has ruled on the sufficiency of plaintiff s case it is simply too late to 
inject a new issue into the case."). 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision to allow Franklin to introduce 
additional evidence as to the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed if the trial 
court, in its discretion, determines that such additional evidence is required in order for 
Franklin to proceed with its judicial or non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Franklin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Memorandum Decision 
and Judgment. Franklin further requests that this Court deny Defendants' cross appeal. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed, Franklin requests that it receive its attorney fees 
and costs incurred on appeal 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2010. 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
MATTHEW D. COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellant and 
Cross Appellee 
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Franklin Credit Management 
Corporation 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual; 
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual; 
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF 
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and 1 
THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a revocable 
trust, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 26(A)(1) INITIAL 
DISCLOSURES 
Case No. 050700241 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Plaintiff Franklin Credit Management Corporation ("Plaintiff') makes the following 
initial disclosures based upon information currently and reasonably available: 
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1. Identities of the Individuals Likely to Have Discoverable Information. Plaintiff 
identifies the following individuals as likely to have discoverable information supporting its 
claims and defenses: 
Blaine J. Hanney 
Contact through Ben Rasmussen, counsel for Mr. Hanney 
Subjects: All subjects 
Shirley A. Hanney 
80 South Orange Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Subjects: All subjects 
Erik K. Iverson 
5562 South 150 East 
Ogden, UT 
(801)475-4798 
Subjects: Bank One Trust Deed 
Stephen M. Enderton 
234 East 3900 South, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
(801)281-0252 
Subjects: Bankruptcy schedules filed by the Hanneys 
Henry Vantienderen 
7001 South 900 East, Suite 240 
Midvale, UT 84047 
(801)262-3596 
Subjects: Tax returns filed by the Hanneys 
Mark Shepard 
Contact through George W. Pratt, counsel for American General 
Subjects: Subordination of American General Trust Deed 
David E. Shelton 
692 East 3050 North 
North Ogden, UT 84414 
Subjects: Power of Attorney dated February 22, 1995 
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Carol W. Kap 
742 Taylor Ave 
Ogden, UT 84404 
(801)394-6006 
Subject: Tax returns filed by the Hanneys 
John H. Geilmann 
1600 W. Towne Center Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
(801)254-3742 
Subjects: The Hanney Family Trust 
Shelley M Lewis 
P.O. Box 16430 
Boise, ID 83715 
Subjects: Reconveyance of KeyBank Trust Deed. 
Kasey L, Eaton 
Twentieth Century Mortgage 
180 East 2100 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801)493-0179 
Subjects: Bank One loan 
Inwest Title Services, Inc. 
471 West Heritage Park Blvd, Suite 6 
Layton, UT 84041 
(801)773-9806 
Subjects: Disbursement of proceeds of Bank One loan 
2. Relevant Documents, Relevant, non-privileged documents in Plaintiffs 
possession, custody or control that support its claims and defenses are attached hereto as Exhibit 
A. Plaintiffs claims and defenses are also supported by the pleadings, schedules, exhibits, 
deposition transcripts and other documents filed in Bankruptcy Case No. 03-24754 and/or 
Adversary Case No. 052133. 
3. Damages. Plaintiffs computation of damages is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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3; 
it 
\; Plaintiff is also seeking to recover its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with the 
!f Bank One loan, which have yet to be determined. 
C:t 
*' 
g 4. Insurance Agreements. Stewart Title Guaranty Company issued a lender's title 
e* insurance policy, Policy No. M-9994-5085620, to Plaintiffs assignor, Bank One, N.A. A copy 
of the lender's policy is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
DATED this (jl^day of December, 2006. 
^L. 
JOHN B. WILSON 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I[)e< :iei nbei 08, 2006 
BLAINE! J HANNEY 
3037 E! 3050 NORTH 
L AYTOM UT 84040 i 
Payoff figures have been requested on the loan for the borrower-arid p r o p e l described below. 
Loan ID! 0014023159 j 
BLAINd J HANNEY, 529667867 ! 
SHIRLEY A HANNEY, 528669718 \ 
3037 E^ST 3050 NORTH | 
LAYTOfs!,UT 84040 } 
I oan Type: Conventional j 
All payoff proceeds must be in the form of guaranteed certified funds. When remitting funds, 
please use our loan number to insure proper posting and provide us with the borrower's 
forwarding address. Funds received In this office after 12:00 noon wil l be processed on the 
next business day, with interest charged to that date. Pay offs submitted to an 
inappropriate address may be subject to additional interest, late charges and may be 
reported delinquent to all major credit agencies. j 
Express Payments / Over Night Other Pay Off 
Franklin Credit Payoff Department 
110 East Main Street 
Saiineyille, Ohio 43945 
Attention: Barb Webb 
Franklin Credit Payoff Department 
P.O. Box 205. 
Salineville, Ohio 43945 
Attention: Barb Webb 
All payoff figures are subject to clearance of funds in transit The payoff is subject, to final audit 
when presented. Any overpayment or refunds will be mailed directly to the borrower, We m ill 
prepare ,the release of our interest in the property after all funds have cleared. 
i i 
Projected Payoff Date 
principal Balance 
Merest to 12/31/2006 
Fees 
(Prepayment Penalty 
Release Fees 
[Funds owed by Borrower 
|Funds owed to Borrower 
Total Payoff 
12/31/2006 
$245,590.25 
$102,396.36 
$ '547.42 
: $0.00 
$! 25.00 
$0.00 
! $0.00 
$348,559.03 
Per diem . $! 63.92 
The next payment due is 10/13/2002. Payments are made by Billing on a Monthly basis. The 
current interest rate is 9.5000% and the P & I payment is $2,082;84. 
PLEASE CALL THE NUMBER LISTED BELOW TO UPDATE FIGURES PRIOR TO 
REMITTING FUNDS AS THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. 
I " j 
1-800-255-5897 
POI 
12/6/2006! 
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Franklin Credit Management 
Corporation 
201 South Main Street, Suite 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
ieicpfl . i l l . ie, {oKJl) ^5^-LjLJt 
Facsimile: (801) 536-611.1 
rSt fc^ 
— • a ~ f 
r r.D >J u 
| FEB - 6 vfi*'' 1 
^ " S E C O N D j 
DISTRICT COURT j 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
\NKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
H-'PORATTOV -.r)daw;ir- -ornontli.-i* 
i'lamtiff, 
vs. 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual; 
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual; 
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF 
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation: .. , 
THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a ro ocabk 
trust, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS 
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND THE 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST'S SECOND 
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
Case No. 050700241 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
I hereby certify that on this jJJ^Z ; ^ -- February, 2009, I caused to be mailed, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
m i T I M M I I M I i i imiNhin siJ11 iiii< n \ \ \ n MIYIII \ i m i s r s 
SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE to: 
Cert i f icate of Service of PfaintfFs Supplemental Rspor 
08439.117/4811-9319-4)403.) in VD28039326 pacjes: 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
George W. Pratt 
JONES WALDO HOI BROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 South Main Street. Suite 1500 
Sal: Lal« Citv. TIT 84101 
IMN 
JOHN B. WILSON 
LAURA S SCO I I 
PARSON- Bl-i ILL & LATIMER 
Atto-.-w ' • m i i " t i f f 
084 • i'?-48ll-9il9-«-1(' Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Credit 
Management Corporation 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, 
BLAlNli J. HANNLX, an individual; 
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual; 
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF 
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and 
THE HANNEY FAMILY TRUST, a revocable 
trust, 
-»uenu.Li! 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS 
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND THE 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST'S SECOND 
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
Case No. 050700241 
ludge Rodney S. Page 
I.until! Franklin Credit Managemeni ( orporation t Franklin""- Hereby supplements its 
response f ,.• ;<......-.:. IMJ.A .-. . 
Discovery Requests ("Discovery Requests") as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Franklin hereby incorporates its General Objections as set forth in Plaintiffs Responses 
Requests served on January 28, 2009. 
Fi anklin hei eby supplen lents its Response to Request f 4'o. 5 as follow s: 
REQUEST NO, 5: Please provide an itemized description of all damages.. 
RESPONSE: Franklin incorporates its general obj^uion.* i wOjeclnsiis. 
hranUiit responds us follows Franklin's (iiinaj'cs, includes the unpaid principal, micicza ana iaic 
fees under the Bank One Loan as well as its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in attempting to 
31, 2009, the following amounts are due and owing under the Bank One Loan: 
Unpaid »Tit.,4i,J: ' $2- 15,590 25 
Unpaid Interest. $150,977.26 
Unpaid Late Fees: $ 142 42 
l||ii.f(unices1 h r s ami ("ml i 1 HIl| 
I ) A ITU M l i i s ¥ _ da;> < >£ Febi i lai ) , 2009. 
JOHN B.WILSON 
I AURAS. SCOTT 
NUNS Bi:iII H& LATIMER 
Attorneys for I'lamtiff 
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
LAURA S.SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Franklin Credit Manama"'1'11 
Corporation 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVKJL Ut 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS 
BLAINE J. HANNEY AND THE 
HANNEY FAMILY TRUST'S SECONI> 
^ET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
BLAINE J. HANNEY, an individual; 
SHIRLEY A. HANNEY, an individual; 
AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE OF 
UTAH, INC., a Utah corporation; STI 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Nevada corporation; and 
THE HANNEY FAMILV IT'i ^ r revocable 
trust, 
Defendants. 
.udge Rodney S. Page 
I liriehv d'Hilv lliiil mi llii, L/> ii» ' ! ! >f i caused to be mailed, a uue 
nnect cop :,i ilu- foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
.DANTS I 
SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS and this CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE to: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
George W. Pratt 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite I 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
V\ I'El) this H day of February, 2009. 
JOHN B. WILSON 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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